Sudan is experiencing a complex crisis fueled by the financial operations of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a powerful non-state actor led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti. With annual revenues estimated between $1 and $2 billion, the RSF engages in various illicit activities, including gold mining, narcotics, and agriculture, generating immense wealth amidst national turmoil. This economic model underpins a conflict that has resulted in the displacement of over 12 million people and has prompted the U.S. to characterize the violence in Darfur as genocide.

The Shift in Narcotics Production

A new development in this landscape is the rise of the narcotics industry, particularly in light of the decline of Syria’s state-sponsored Captagon production following the regime’s collapse in late 2024. Sudan is positioning itself to fill this void, effectively becoming a crucial player in the narcotics market. Reports indicate that the RSF has increased its production capacity for these illicit substances nearly 14 times over the past two years, seizing the opportunity left by Syria’s downfall. This diversification in revenue sources has significant implications for the duration and intensity of the ongoing conflict.

Gold: The Cornerstone of RSF Revenue

Gold mining remains the linchpin for the RSF’s finances, contributing an estimated $860 million from the Darfur mines alone in 2024. Overall production in Sudan ranges from 70 to 90 tonnes annually, with a concerning fraction—around 50%—smuggled out of the country. This underworld economy not only enriches the RSF but also enables it to sustain prolonged military operations.

Since the outbreak of war in April 2023, the geographic focus of gold mining has transformed. The once lucrative Jebel Amer mines in North Darfur, initially the epicenter of Hemedti’s wealth, have experienced a significant downturn due to assaults from the Sudanese Armed Forces. In contrast, the Songo mines in South Darfur have emerged as the new focal point for RSF mining activities, with the Dagalo family’s Al-Junaid Multi Activities Company resuming operations there by late 2025. According to analysis from Chatham House, the RSF employs multiple strategies to control this lucrative sector: direct mining via Al-Junaid, leveraging protection rackets on artisanal miners, and smaller, independent units that engage in extraction and extortion.

Impact on the Humanitarian Crisis

The wealth generated through these illicit activities has severe repercussions for the humanitarian situation in Sudan. With the RSF’s financial capabilities, they continue to cling to power while worsening the plight of millions. The United Nations has documented widespread atrocities linked to the RSF, further escalating the urgency for international intervention. One of the most troubling aspects of this situation is the humanitarian crisis that has developed as a direct consequence of the RSF’s operations.

In conclusion, the economic strategies employed by Sudan’s RSF, particularly in gold mining and narcotics production, illustrate the intricate connections between finance and violence in the region. With significant resources backing their operations, the RSF is well-equipped to prolong the conflict, ultimately perpetuating the cycle of displacement and instability. As the world watches, the need for effective diplomatic and humanitarian responses has never been more crucial.